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Abstract Reactions toward innocent victims can range from harsh derogatory reac-
tions to great effort to alleviate the victims’ ill fates. Using insights from research on just-
world theory and perspective taking, the current paper investigates both negative and
positive reactions toward innocent victims. Specifically, we propose that self-focused
versus other-focused motives can evoke derogatory versus more benevolent reactions,
respectively, toward innocent victims. By manipulating self-focus versus other-focus,
we indeed show in two studies that a self-focus enhanced indirect victim blaming and
derogation and decreased helping of innocent victims. Furthermore, when participants
were focused on another person these effects attenuated. Taken together, these findings
extend previous studies on just-world theory and show that both blaming and helping can
be viable strategies to deal with unjust situations.
Keywords Self-focus versus other-focus  Belief in just world threats  Victim
blaming and derogation  Helping
Introduction
Imagine that, while having your breakfast on a Saturday morning, you read in the
newspaper that a fellow student or colleague of yours was involved in a severe
accident. That is, while cycling home after an evening on the town, he got hit by a
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car on an unsafe crossing. In the accident, he suffered severe head trauma.
Furthermore, because he has to go through intensive rehabilitation to re-obtain all
his cognitive skills and his insurance will not pay for this he probably has to give up
his dream of becoming a successful researcher. The university set up a fundraiser
for his rehabilitation and you can help. What would you do? Would you spend time
raising money for the victim? Or would you think ‘‘why was he so careless;
everybody knows how dangerous that crossing is’’? Or maybe even ‘‘he probably
had one too many beers with his friends and did not pay attention at the crossing’’?
When people are confronted with victims, whether it be individual cases or mass
suffering, they often have to decide how to react. In the current research, we look at
key variables that can influence the construal of such events, making either blaming
or helping a more likely option to deal with the confrontation with an innocent
victim. That is, building on and extending earlier theorizing, we propose that
innocent victims can arouse empathic feelings in an observer, because they have
been treated unjustly, but that victims may also evoke fear in people of a similar ill
fate bestowing on them and, as such, elicit feelings of threat (Gilligan, 1977; Lerner,
1980; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976). We put forward that these different
reactions to the unjust event could be evoked by differences in focus people can
have (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Van Lange, 1999). In
particular, we examine whether people react differently toward victims of injustice
than people when they are self-focused as opposed to other-focused.
Self-Focused Versus Other-Focused Orientations
The idea that humans are self-focused is pervasive in many fields of science, such as
economics and law (see, e.g., Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1973). According to this
perspective, people are self-interested rational beings who weigh costs and benefits in
hopefully rational manners to arrive at a decision. And indeed, in many situations people
are self-interested. This homo economicusview of mankind, however, cannot explain all
human behavior and every decision people make. That is, people sometimes make
decisions that are clearly not self-interested, but that are more focused on others and on
gaining a positive outcome for others, at times even at personal costs (Batson, 1998).
Feeling valued and respected by other people and important groups fulfill core human
needs (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This other-oriented perspective is substantiated
by the facts that people are social animals (Aronson, 1972; De Waal, 1996) and that
humans live in groups where they need social contact and depend on others for certain
goods and services (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Martin, 1999). This homo socialis view
of mankind complements the well-known homo economicus view and underscores the
other-oriented focus of human nature.
In line with the proposed differences between self-orientations and other-
orientations, many influential social psychological theories make a distinction
between self-focused and other-focused needs or values (e.g., Baumeister & Leary,
1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Van Lange, Otten, De
Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Most of these theories assume that people have a
predisposition to be either more self- or other-focused and that situational influences
can shift people’s focus toward stronger self-orientations or other-orientations (e.g.,
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Brucks & Van Lange, 2007; Van Lange, 1999). We argue that an important field in
which these different focuses could influence decisions people make is in the field of
social justice, and, more specifically, in reacting to victims of injustice.
Just-World Theory
Relevant for the current purposes is just-world theory (Lerner, 1977, 1980), a
seminal theory that aims to explain the paradoxical negative reactions people
sometimes have toward innocent victims of injustice. In this theory it is argued that
people have a fundamental need to believe that the world is a just place where
people get what they deserve; a place in which good things happen to good people
and bad things happen to bad people. This belief in a just world (BJW) serves
important functions for individuals as it helps them to navigate through the social
world. Importantly, it enables people to strive for long-term goals (Bal & Van den
Bos, 2012; Hafer, 2000a). That is, if people can have faith that everyone gets what
they deserve and, hence, that their efforts will pay off in the end, they are able to
deal with the uncertainty that is associated with investing in long-term goals (Bal &
Van den Bos, 2012). Hence, the BJW is a belief that people want to uphold.
When people observe an innocent victim, they are confronted with the fact that
the world in reality is not just. That is why innocent victims pose a threat to people’s
just-world belief. Victim blaming and derogation have been shown to relieve a BJW
threat and uphold the BJW because the victims become deserving of their ill fate
(e.g., Hafer, 2000b; Hafer & Be`gue, 2005). Just-world theory can also explain why
victim blaming and derogation is enhanced when the victims are similar to the
observer (Bal & Van den Bos, 2010; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2001, 2007; Hafer,
2000b). According to just-world theory, these counterintuitive findings arise,
because a similar victim (as opposed to a dissimilar victim) will pose a greater BJW
threat and heighten the fear that a similar ill fate might bestow on the observer.
Hence, both innocent victims and similar victims will evoke stronger reactions to
cope with the BJW threat (Lerner, 1980; Hafer, 2000b).
In the real world, however, we do not only see derogatory reactions when people
are confronted with innocent suffering. In contrast, people sometimes go to great
lengths to help or support those in need, for instance by donating money and time to
alleviate the victims’ suffering or taking a stand against injustice. These benevolent
reactions were part of just-world theory at its introduction (Lerner, 1980; Lerner &
Simmons, 1966). That is, Lerner (1980) proposed restitution as a possible strategy to
resolve BJW threats. Yet, since the introduction of just-world theory, most research
has focused on the negative reactions toward innocent victims (for an overview, see
Hafer & Be`gue, 2005). Benevolent reactions have only received minor attention in
research on just-world theory, with a few notable exceptions (see, e.g., Be`gue,
Charmoillaux, Cochet, Cury, & De Suremain, 2008; DePalma, Madey, Tillman, &
Wheeler, 1999; Hafer & Gosse, 2010; Kogut, 2011). These studies have focused
largely on individual differences in just-world beliefs to explain differences in
helping and did not manipulate BJW threats nor did they focus on underlying
processes that drive reactions to these threats.
276 Soc Just Res (2015) 28:274–292
123
In the current line of research, we aim to complement the existing body of
literature by focusing on key social psychological moderators that can be
hypothesized to influence the negative as well as positive reactions toward victims
of injustice. That is, we investigate whether differences in construal of the unjust
event in either a more self-focused or other-focused way can make blaming of
innocent victims or an effort to help these victims a more likely strategy to resolve
the injustice. In the following section, we will further explain why we think these
different focuses could influence reactions toward innocent victims by discussing
earlier related research.
Self-Focus Versus Other-Focus in Reactions Toward Innocent Victims
Research on perspective taking lends support for the idea that a self-focus versus an
other-focus can evoke diverging interpretations of a specific event. That is, studies
have shown that in perspective taking it is important to distinguish between placing
yourself in the other person’s shoes (imagine-self) and a more detached imagining
how the other feels (imagine-other; e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarini, 1997; Lamm,
Batson, & Decety, 2007). In the study conducted by Batson et al. (1997),
participants in the imagine-self condition were asked to imagine how a similar
situation would be for them (self-focus), whereas they imagined how the other must
feel in the imagine-other condition (other-focus). While the former enhanced
feelings of distress primarily, the latter also enhanced feelings of empathic concern.
Here we argue that these feelings of distress (when self-focused) and empathy
(when other-focused) may result in very different reactions toward victims of
injustice.
Specifically, we propose that a self-focus enhances distress of a similar fate
happening to the observer (i.e., a BJW threat), resulting in enhanced derogatory
reactions to resolve this threat. Furthermore, we put forward that an other-focus
enhances empathic feelings, resulting in more benevolent reactions (cf. Lerner et al.,
1976). Hence, when other-focused people may not interpret the confrontation with
the innocent victim as a BJW threat and, hence, reactions may not strongly be
affected by variations in BJW threat. How the distinction between self-focused and
other-focused construals of events relates to people’s benevolent and derogatory
reactions toward innocent victims of injustice will be investigated in the current
research.
Some studies on derogatory reactions toward innocent victims assumed, but did
not test directly, that a self-focus or an other-focus could underlie victim blaming.
Specifically, the role of the self in negative reactions toward innocent victims has
received some attention in research on self-regulation and the BJW. For example,
Loseman and Van den Bos (2012) argued that a victim enhances aversive thoughts
and emotions, because he/she poses a self-threat to the observer. Hence, they
suggested that people will be primarily focused on the consequences of a BJW
threat for the self when blaming an innocent victim. Other studies showed that
mimicking reduced victim blaming, regardless of whether people mimicked the
person who they later learned was victimized or a different person. In this line of
research Stel, Van den Bos, and Bal (2012) suggested (but did not test) that
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mimicking might put people in a general other-oriented mindset. In the current line
of research, we will directly manipulate a self-focus and an other-focus and examine
the effects of these manipulations on both victim blaming and victim helping.
Taken together, the studies reviewed are in line with our proposed line of
reasoning and lend some indirect support for the proposition that a self-focus might
enhance and an other-focus might reduce derogatory reactions toward innocent
victims of injustice. However, this assumption has not been tested directly.
Moreover, these studies did not examine whether a self-focus and an other-focus are
related toward helping of innocent victims, as our line of reasoning predicts. Hence,
we contribute to the existing body of research in at least two important ways.
The Current Research
In two studies, we set out to investigate the influence of adopting a self- versus an
other-focus on the diverging behavioral reactions toward innocent victims of
injustice. We propose that a self-focus will enhance derogatory reactions toward
innocent victims and suppress helping of the victims involved. We further propose
that an other-focus will decrease derogatory reactions toward innocent victims and
enhance helping of the victims involved. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Bal &
Van den Bos, 2012, Hafer, 2000b, Loseman & Van den Bos, 2012; Van den Bos &
Maas, 2009; Van Prooijen & Van den Bos, 2009), we expect to find these effects
especially following a high BJW threat. In these instances, people have a clear need
to restore their BJW, whereas under a low BJW threat, reactions can be less
pronounced (Hafer, 2000b).
In the two studies we induced a self-focus or an other-focus and investigated
blaming (Study 1) and helping reactions (Study 2) toward innocent victims of
injustice. We also included a neutral control condition in both studies. In this
condition we did not manipulate focus. By comparing the results from this control
condition to the self-focus and other-focus conditions, we gain insight into how
people generally react toward innocent victims and thus how we should interpret the
effects obtained in the self- and other-focused conditions.
Study 1
In Study 1 we focused on negative reactions toward innocent victims and examined
whether a self-focus as opposed to an other-focus would enhance victim blaming
and derogation. We manipulated focus by asking participants to think back to and
describe a situation in which they were either self-focused or other-focused.
Following this manipulation, participants read a newspaper article about an
accident. To induce a high or low BJW threat, we manipulated whether the crime
was distal or proximal (Bal & Van den Bos, 2010). According to Lerner and Miller
(1978, p. 1031), ‘‘as events become closer to [people’s] world (…), the concern over
injustices increases greatly as does the need to explain or make sense of the event.’’
In earlier studies, social proximity has been manipulated to induce a high and low
BJW threat successfully (e.g., Bal & Van den Bos, 2010, Correia et al., 2007).
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Physical proximity, we believe, works in a similar way and has been used as a
manipulation of BJW threat successfully in previous research (Bal & Van den Bos,
2012, Study 3). Subsequently, we measured victim blaming and derogation in a
subtle manner that may be reflective of how people ascribe responsibility to the
victim in the real world. That is, we asked participants to estimate how much
alcohol they thought the victim had drunk before the accident (Girasek, Gielen &
Smith, 2002).
We predicted that a self-focus would lead to more blaming reactions toward the
victim (i.e., more alcohol consumed by the victim) than an other-focus. This effect
was expected to occur especially under a high BJW threat, so when participants
were confronted with a proximal as opposed to a distal victim. To establish whether
people normally react from a self- or an other-focused perspective when confronted
with an unjust situation, we also included a neutral control condition in Study 1 in
which we did not manipulate focus.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and seventy Utrecht University students (71 men and 99 women)
participated in our study.1 Their ages ranged from 18 to 34 years (M = 21.33,
SD = 2.02). The study had a 3 (Focus: self vs. other vs. control) 9 2 (BJW threat:
high vs. low) between-subjects design. Between 25 and 31 participants took part in
each of the six conditions.
Procedure and Materials
The researchers approached students at different restaurants at the Uithof campus of
Utrecht University and were asked whether they wanted to fill out a short
questionnaire. When students were willing to participate, a questionnaire was
handed to them and the researchers continued to approach other potential
participants. After about 15 min the researchers came back to collect the
questionnaire and participants were thanked and debriefed. The study started with
our focus manipulation. Subsequently, participants read a newspaper article about
an accident and negative reactions toward the victim were measured. The
experiment ended with some demographic questions.
Focus Manipulation In the other-focused condition, participants were asked to
think of a situation in which they were focused on another person and to describe
that situation in detail. This was followed by three open-ended questions: (1)
‘‘Please describe, as specifically as possible, how that person acted in the situation,’’
(2) ‘‘Please describe what feelings you think this other person had in that situation,’’
1 A total number of 180 participants took part in Study 1. Nine participants were excluded from analyses
because of missing values and 1 because he had a Cook’s (1977) distance score more than 3 SDs above
the mean in the main analyses (Cohen et al., 2003). This resulted in an effective sample of 170
participants.
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(3) ‘‘Please describe what you think the other person thought in that situation.’’ In
the self-focused condition, participants were asked to think of a situation in which
they were focused on themselves and to describe that situation in detail. This was
followed by three open-ended questions: (1) ‘‘Please describe, as specifically as
possible, how you acted in the situation,’’ (2) ‘‘Please describe what feelings you
had in that situation,’’ (3) ‘‘Please describe what you thought in that situation.’’ In
the control condition, no such questions were asked. Similar salience manipulations
have been used to induce mindsets pertaining to uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2001)
and status (Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002).2
BJW Threat In an ostensibly unrelated experiment, participants read a newspaper
article about Thomas Weijers (a typical Dutch name). Thomas had spent his evening
with friends, but decided to go home earlier than his friends at 2 a.m. and left by
himself. When he was cycling home, he got hit by a car on a dangerous crossing.
Thomas loses consciousness and wakes up in the hospital. He suffered a severe head
injury and became paralyzed from the waist down because of this accident. The
driver of the car did not stop after hitting Thomas and was therefore not caught.
To induce a high or low BJW threat, proximity was manipulated. In the high-
threat condition, Thomas was described as a fellow Utrecht University student and
the accident happened in Utrecht. In the low-threat condition, Thomas was
described as a Groningen University student and the accident took place in
Groningen (a different Dutch city far away from Utrecht).
Indirect Negative Reactions After an explicit blaming and derogation question-
naire (Bal & Van den Bos, 2010) and some filler questions about the article,
participants were asked with an open-ended question how many glasses of alcohol
they thought the victim had drunk before he was involved in the accident. Whether
or not the victim had drunk alcohol was not explicitly mentioned in the newspaper
article. Alcohol intoxication indicates that the victim was (partially) to blame for the
accident according to the participants (e.g., Girasek, Gielen & Smith, 2002), so we
took the amount of glasses of alcohol participants’ estimated Thomas had consumed
2 We conducted a separate manipulation check on the computers in the lab to see whether out focus
manipulation worked as expected. In this study, 105 students (44 men and 61 women) participated. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 38 years (M = 20.76, SD = 2.91). The study started with our focus manipulation,
creating three conditions in which between 33 and 35 participants took part. Subsequently, we measured
whether our manipulation worked as intended by measuring participants’ focus. Specifically, we asked
participants to what degree they were (1) focused on themselves, (2) focused on others, (3) thinking about
themselves, (4) thinking about other people, and whether they were more self or other -focused and
thinking about themselves or others more at this moment. In the self and other- focus condition the order
of the questions fit the manipulation (i.e., self-focus: 1-2-3-4; other-focus: 2-1-4-3). In the control
condition, the order of the questions was counterbalanced to check for order effects. No order effects were
found in this condition, F(1, 33) = 0.30, p[ .59, gp
2 = .01. An ANOVA on the manipulation check with
focus as independent variable revealed a main effect of our focus manipulation, F(2, 102) = 6.46,
p\ .01, gp
2 = .11. Participants in the other-focus condition (M = 3.72, SD = 1.25) reported being more
other-focused than participants in both the self-focus condition (M = 2.81, SD = 0.77), p\ .01, and the
control condition (M = 3.19, SD = 1.08), p\ .04. The self-focused condition did not differ significantly
from the control condition, even though the pattern of results was in the expected direction, p[ .14. This
may indicate that people generally adopt a self-focused mindset.
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as an indirect measure of participants’ negative evaluation of the victim. We
indicated to participants that they could fill in ‘‘0’’ if they thought the victim did not
drink any alcohol that night.
Results
A 3 (Focus) 9 2 (BJW threat) ANOVA3 on glasses of alcohol revealed a significant
main effect of BJW threat, F(1, 164) = 5.09, p\ .03, gp
2 = .03. This effect was
qualified by a two-way interaction between focus and BJW threat, F(2, 164) = 3.57,
p\ .03, gp
2 = .04. As can be seen in Fig. 1, statistically significant effects of the
focus manipulation were found in the high BJW threat condition, F(2, 164) = 3.70,
p\ .03, gp
2 = .04, and not in the low BJW threat condition, F(2, 164) = 0.90,
p[ .41, gp
2 = .01. To further interpret these effects, we performed a least significant
difference test for multiple comparisons between means (p\ .05), with the six cells
of our design serving as the independent variable. Figure 1 shows the results of this
test. As hypothesized, under a high BJW threat self-focused participants evaluated
the victim more negatively (M = 4.59, SD = 2.89) than participants with an other-
focus (M = 2.84, SD = 2.35). Furthermore, participants in the control condition
(M = 4.17, SD = 2.37) also evaluated the victim more negatively than other-
focused participants. The control condition did not differ from the self-focus
condition.
Additionally, the least significant difference test revealed that, when focused on
themselves, participants thought that the proximal victim had drunk more than the
distal victim (M = 2.92, SD = 3.38). In the control condition, participants also
indicated that the proximal victim drank more glasses of alcohol than the distal
victim (M = 2.50, SD = 2.33). When focused on another person, this effect
attenuated and was not statistically significant (other-focus & distal victim:
M = 3.44, SD = 2.36).4
Discussion
The results of Study 1 revealed that self-focused people blamed the proximal
victim more for what happened to him than other-focused people, indicated by the
3 In Studies 1 and 2, including gender in our analyses had no significant effects on the variables analyzed.
We therefore dropped gender from the analyses reported.
4 In Study 1, we also included the negative victim evaluation questionnaire (a = .92; cf. Bal & Van den
Bos, 2010, 2012). A 3 (Focus) 9 2 (BJW threat) 9 2 (Gender) ANOVA on negative evaluation revealed
a main effect of BJW threat, F(1, 158) = 6.41 p\ .02, gp
2 = .04, a main effect of gender, F(1,
158) = 9.34, p\ .01, gp
2 = .06, and a significant three-way interaction between focus, BJW threat, and
gender, F(2, 158) = 2.16, p\ .04, gp
2 = .04. Conducting separate analyses for men and women (Bal &
Van den Bos, 2010), analyses revealed that men only show a significant main effect of BJW threat, such
that they evaluated the proximal victim (M = 2.64, SD = 0.88) more negatively than the distal victim
(M = 2.29, SD = 0.67), F(1, 65) = 4.20, p\ .04, gp
2 = .07. For women, a significant two-way
interaction of BJW threat and focus was found, F(2, 93) = 3.57, p\ .04, gp
2 = .07. Only in the self-focus
condition did women evaluate a proximal victim (M = 2.52, SE = 0.19) more negatively than a distal
victim (M = 1.76, SE = 0.20), F(1, 93) = 7.79, p\ .01, gp2 = .08. These gender differences were
absent, in our more subtle measure of victim blaming that asked about alcohol intake.
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amount of alcohol they estimated the victim to have consumed before the
accident. Moreover, this effect was only there following a high BJW threat as
opposed to a low BJW threat. In the control condition, people also indicated that
the victim drank more alcohol following a high BJW threat as opposed to a low
BJW threat. This effect attenuated in the other-focused condition. As such,
reactions observed in the control condition were more similar to responses
obtained in the self-focused condition than to those observed in the other-focused
condition. Perhaps this indicates that a self-focus might be the default when
confronted with an innocent victim. Future studies can be conducted to
substantiate this idea.
We would like to emphasize that the newspaper article was presented to our
research participants as an unrelated study. As such, participants could not take the
victim’s perspective in the focus manipulation. Moreover, many situations
participants described in the other-focus condition had nothing to do with taking
an other’s perspective (e.g., listening to a lecturer). In our view, an other-focused
construal of the world around you could encompass, but does not exclusively entail
taking another person’s perspective. Furthermore, taking another’s perspective, can
lead to more, but also to less, empathic reactions. That is, earlier research showed
that two forms of perspective taking exist (Lamm et al., 2007). People can either
imagine themselves in the other person’s shoes or imagine how the other must feel.
Lamm et al. (2007) showed that while the former enhanced feelings of distress, only
the latter also enhanced feelings of empathic concern. Hence, we believe that focus
is different from perspective taking in several ways and propose that an other-focus
specifically will lead to more benign reactions toward innocent victims. In Study 1,
we found that derogatory reactions toward victims were reduced in the other-focus
condition as opposed to the self-focus condition. To see how more benign ways of
dealing with a BJW threat are affected by focus, in Study 2, we examine victim
























Fig. 1 Participants’ estimates
of glasses of alcohol drank by
the victim as a function of focus
and BJW threat (Study 1). Note
Means with no letters (a, b) in
common differ significantly
(p\ .05), as indicated by a least
significant difference test for
multiple comparisons between
means (Kirk, 1982)
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Study 2
In Study 2 we focused on positive reactions toward innocent victims and examined
whether an other-focus as opposed to a self-focus would enhance helping of
innocent victims. The experimental setup was largely similar to Study 1 in that we
used the same focus manipulation and victim scenario. However, in Study 2 we
measured positive reactions following the confrontation with an innocent victim.
That is, participants could help the victim by raising money for his rehabilitation.
Thus, we measured actual helping and not merely helping intentions.
We expected that an other-focus would lead to more help for the victim (i.e.,
spending more time raising money) than a self-focus. This effect was expected to
occur especially under a high BJW threat, so when participants were confronted
with a proximal as opposed to a distal victim. As in Study 1, we also included a
neutral control condition, in which we did not manipulate focus, to obtain additional
evidence about how people normally react to innocent victims from a self-focused
or an other-focused perspective.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and thirty-seven Utrecht University students (70 men and 67 women)
participated.5 Their ages ranged from 17 to 43 years (M = 21.33, SD = 3.00). The
study had a 3 (Focus: self vs. other vs. control) 9 2 (BJW threat: high vs. low)
between-subjects design. Between 20 and 27 participants took part in each of the six
conditions.
Procedure and Materials
Participants were invited to take part in this study with flyers posted at different
locations on the Uithof campus of Utrecht University. Upon arrival in the
laboratory, participants were seated behind a computer in individual cubicles. The
study started with our focus manipulation. Subsequently, participants read the
newspaper article used in Study 1. Following this, participants were asked to
volunteer some time to help the victim by solving math problems to raise money.
The experiment was programmed on the computer from start to finish.
Focus Manipulation The focus manipulation was the same as in Study 1.
BJW Threat BJW threat was manipulated through using the same newspaper
article as in Study 1.
5 A total number of 164 participants took part in Study 2. Eighteen participants were excluded from
analyses because they had participated in Study 1; 5 because they indicated that they had not complied
with the instructions; and 4 because they had a Cook’s (1977) distance score more than 3 SDs above the
mean in the main analyses (Cohen et al., 2003). This resulted in an effective sample of 137 participants.
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Helping the Victim After reading the newspaper article, participants learned that
the victim suffered severe neurological damage, because of the accident. Without
help from a personal study coach, he would therefore not be able to finish his study.
Participants could voluntarily help the victim and raise money for a personal study
coach by solving math problems. This procedure was based on Freerice.com, a
website hosted by the United Nations World Food Programme that provides rice to
hungry people. On the website you can answer trivia questions in several categories
and earn rice grains for each correct answer. The rice that you earned is donated to
the World Food Programme. We programmed a similar paradigm for our
experiment, which was focused on helping Thomas by raising money for a personal
study coach. Participants were asked to solve math problems of increasing difficulty
ranging from simple additions and subtractions (e.g., 5 ? 8) to multiple divisions
and multiplications (e.g., 9 9 7 9 3). For each set of two correct answers,
participants raised € 0.05 for Thomas. Participants could spend as much time as they
wanted on solving the math problems with a maximum number of 200 problems.
They could opt to stop throughout the task by clicking a button that remained on the
screen during the task. Money raised in euros and time spent on the math problems
in milliseconds constituted our main dependent variables.
Results
Time Spent on the Sums
As scores on this variable were skewed to the right, we performed a log-
transformation on the scores before analyzing the data (Fazio, 1990). For ease of
interpretation, untransformed means and standard deviations are presented in Fig. 2
and below. A 3 (Focus) 9 2 (BJW threat) ANOVA on time spent on the sums
revealed a marginally significant main effect of BJW threat, F(1, 131) = 3.20,
p\ .08, gp
2 = .02. This effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction
between focus and BJW threat, F(2, 131) = 5.30, p\ .01, gp
2 = .08. As can be seen
a 
b 

























Fig. 2 Time spent on the sums as a function of focus and BJW threat (Study 2). Note Means with no
letters (a, b) in common differ significantly (p\ .05), as indicated by a least significant difference test for
multiple comparisons between means (Kirk, 1982)
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in Fig. 2, statistically significant effects of the focus were found in the high BJW
threat condition, F(2, 131) = 6.63, p\ .01, gp
2 = .09, and not in the low BJW threat
condition, F(2, 131) = 0.76, p[ .47, gp
2 = .01. To further interpret these effects,
we performed a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons between
means (p\ .05), with the six cells of our design serving as the independent variable.
Figure 2 shows the results of this test. As hypothesized, under a high BJW threat
self-focused participants spent less time on solving math problems (M = 174.39,
SD = 204.83) than participants with an other-focus (M = 265.50, SD = 173.84)
and participants in the control condition (M = 199.20, SD = 176.31).
Additionally, the least significant difference test revealed that, when focused on
themselves, participants spent less time solving math problems for the proximal
victim as opposed to the distal victim (M = 241.33, SD = 178.64). The effects of
BJW threat in the other two focus conditions (distal victim and other-focus:
M = 214.79, SD = 189.20; distal victim & control: M = 253.45, SD = 161.52)
were not statistically significant, ps[ .18.
Money Raised
For the amount of money raised for the victim, the effects were comparable to time
spent on helping the innocent victim, although they were less strong. A 3
(Focus) 9 2 (BJW threat) ANOVA on money raised revealed a marginally
significant main effect of BJW threat, F(1, 131) = 3.73, p\ .06, gp
2 = .03. This
effect was qualified by a marginally significant two-way interaction of focus and
BJW threat, F(2, 131) = 2.62, p\ .08, gp
2 = .04. As can be seen in Fig. 3,
statistically significant effects of the focus manipulation were found in the high
BJW threat condition, F(2, 131) = 3.46, p\ .04, gp
2 = .05, and not in the low BJW
threat condition, F(2, 131) = 0.64, p[ .52, gp
2 = .01. To better understand these
effects, we performed a least significant difference test for multiple comparisons
between means (p\ .05), with the six cells of our design serving as the independent
variable. Figure 3 shows the results of this test. As hypothesized, under a high BJW




















Fig. 3 Money raised for the victim as a function of focus and BJW threat (Study 2). Note Means with no
letters (a, b) in common differ significantly (p\ .05), as indicated by a least significant difference test for
multiple comparisons between means (Kirk, 1982)
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SD = 0.81) than participants with an other-focus (M = 1.38, SD = 0.67). There
was no significant difference between the control condition (M = 1.10, SD = 0.77)
and the self-focus condition or the other-focus condition.
Additionally, the least significant difference test revealed that, when focused on
themselves, participants raised less money for the proximal victim as opposed to the
distal victim (M = 1.35, SD = 0.71). The effects of BJW threat in the other two
focus conditions (distal victim and other-focus: M = 1.22, SD = 0.89; distal victim
and control: M = 1.48, SD = 0.74) were not significant, ps[ .11.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 indicate that other-focused people help a proximal victim
more than self-focused people. Furthermore, self-focused people help a high-threat
victim less than a low-threat victim. These findings fit with and extend the findings
from Study 1 and earlier findings on negative reactions following a BJW threat.
That is, self-focused people seem to help an innocent victim less, when they pose a
high BJW threat as opposed to a low BJW threat. This effect attenuated in the other-
focused condition. In the other-focused condition people helped a victim more,
regardless of BJW threat.
In the control condition of Study 2, participants seemed to help an innocent
victim less under a high BJW threat as opposed to a low BJW threat, although this
effect was definitely not statistically significant. Together with the results of Study
1, this could indicate that people generally adopt a self-focus after being confronted
with innocent victims of injustice. Under a high BJW threat though, the control
condition of Study 2 seemed to fall in between the self-focused and the other-
focused conditions. Further studies into supportive reactions following a confronta-
tion with an innocent victim are necessary to further disentangle these effects.
Nevertheless, from both studies it is clear that self-focused people helped an
innocent victim less and blamed her more than other-focused people, especially
under a high BJW threat.
General Discussion
Coming back to the example which we began with in our introduction: What would
you do if you would read about the car accident victim? Would you spend time
raising money for his rehabilitation? Or would you think, why was he so careless;
everybody knows how dangerous that crossing is? Our results suggest that your
focus—whether you view the situation from a self-focused or an other-focused
perspective—could influence whether you would be more inclined to help or blame
the victim. That is, in two studies we found that a self-focus enhanced derogatory
reactions (on measures of victim blaming and derogation and alcohol intake) and
suppressed helping of the victim (on measures based on the Freerice game), whereas
an other-focus enhanced helping and decreased derogatory reactions toward the
victim, especially when the victim involved posed a high BJW threat.
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Taken together, our studies complement the existing body of literature of just-
world theory by studying both derogatory and benevolent reactions toward innocent
victims of injustice (Lerner, 1977, 1980). When just-world theory was introduced,
both victim blaming and derogation and helping were proposed as strategies to
restore the belief in a just world after a confrontation with innocent victims (Lerner,
1980). Yet, benevolent reactions have only received minor attention in research on
just-world theory. Moreover, the studies that have been conducted focused largely
on individual differences in just-world beliefs to explain differences in helping (e.g.,
Be`gue et al., 2008; DePalma et al., 1999). Nevertheless, more recent studies have
focused on a broader array of possible reactions following a BJW threat and on
explaining when people choose to react in a certain way (see, e.g., Hafer & Rubel,
2015; Harvey, Callan & Matthews, 2015). Our current studies fit within this line of
research and aim to further our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
diverging reactions toward innocent victims. Importantly, we have added to the
existing body of literature by introducing an indirect measure of victim blaming and
by studying actual helping behavior (instead of helping intentions).
In our studies, we manipulated BJW threat to gain insight into the processes that
take place when people are confronted with an innocent victim and that make
blaming or helping more likely reactions to resolve the BJW threat. According to
just-world theory, people will first try to help or compensate the victim and only
resort to the more negative derogatory strategies, when benevolent strategies are
deemed futile, too costly, or simply impossible (Lerner & Goldberg, 1999; Lerner
et al., 1976). However, our studies suggest that people’s spontaneous reaction could
be self-focused, resulting in victim blaming and derogation. When people are other-
focused, they will more likely try to help the victims involved. In the other-focused
condition, differences between the high and low BJW threat scenarios attenuated.
Hence, other-focused reactions may not be aimed at resolving a BJW threat
(primarily) and as such may not be related (solely) to the BJW.
In both Studies 1 and 2, we found some support for the idea that people may
become more self-focused when confronted with an innocent victim, although these
effects are less pronounced with regard to benevolent reactions. Self-focused people
indirectly blamed the victim more when she posed a high BJW threat as opposed to
a low BJW threat in Study 1 and they helped the high BJW threat victim less as
opposed to the low BJW threat victim in Study 2. These effects of more blaming
(and less helping) of after a high BJW threat as opposed to a low BJW threat are in
line with earlier findings on victim blaming and derogation (e.g., Bal & Van den
Bos, 2010, 2012; Correia et al., 2001; Hafer, 2000a, b; Van Prooijen & Van den
Bos, 2009). Moreover, we found a similar effect in the control condition of Study 1
and similar pattern in the control condition of Study 2. These findings could suggest
that people might spontaneously adhere to a self-focus when confronted with
innocent victims of injustice. Of course, individual and cultural differences (e.g.,
Cohen, Hoshino-Browne & Leung, 2007) could impact on these effects and future
studies can now look into these differences.
In both studies we used, a BJW threat manipulation of crime proximity. We used
this manipulation of BJW threat, as we believe it to be a clear manipulation of BJW
threat (see also Bal & Van den Bos, 2010). Moreover, although we did not include
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an explicit manipulation check in our current studies, earlier studies did show that
social proximity heightens a BJW threat (e.g., Bal & Van den Bos, 2010; Correaia
et al., 2007). Moreover, our findings in the control condition of Study 1, showing
that people blamed a proximal victim more than a distal victim, are in line with
many earlier studies that included various other successful BJW threat manipulation
(e.g., Hafer, 2000b, Loseman & Van den Bos, 2012; Van den Bos & Maas, 2009;
Van Prooijen & Van den Bos, 2009). Hence, we believe crime proximity to be a
valid manipulation of BJW threat.
That being said, one may argue that our crime proximity manipulation could be
associated with participants’ group membership and as such might be related to our
focus manipulation. While we acknowledge this point, we believe that if our effects
of crime proximity were driven by group membership instead of BJW threat, an
opposite pattern of effects would have been more likely. That is, based on ingroup
favoritism and outgroup derogation (Taifel & Turner, 1979), one would expect the
proximal victim to be blamed less and helped more than the distal victim, because
of heightened identification with and enhanced feelings of empathy for the ingroup
victim. Our findings do not support this line of reasoning, but instead follow a BJW
threat interpretation of the effects (showing more blaming and less helping of
proximal as opposed to distal victims in crucial conditions in our experiments).
Hence, we believe that our findings will hold across different manipulations of BJW
threat. That being said, we hope that the current studies will inspire future research
to examine the role of different BJW threat manipulations in reactions toward
innocent victims of injustice.
Furthermore, we proposed that underlying these reactions of blaming versus
helping, a self-focus would elicit feelings of threat following a confrontation with an
innocent victim, whereas an other-focus would elicit feelings of concern for the
victim (cf. Lamm et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 1976). These different interpretations of
the event would make either victim blaming or helping a more likely reaction,
respectively. In the current research we focused on the subsequent reactions that
follow these appraisals. It would be worthwhile for future research to further look
into and measure these different appraisals of threat and empathy that are possible
after a confrontation with an innocent victim. We note this because helping may not
constitute a BJW threat-related reaction solely and other psychological factors are
important to understand the social psychology of helping as well.
Moreover, we assessed blaming and helping with two different measures. We
also would applaud future research that attempts to measure helping and blaming in
one study with one measure that simultaneously reflects either low levels of blaming
and high levels of helping (or vice versa). This way a greater tendency to either
blame or help a victim could be tested and it could be examined when people choose
what type of reaction instead of studying (the strength of) one type of reaction. For
now, we conclude that our results fit with our line of reasoning, as we found in two
empirical studies that a self-focus made negative reactions more likely, while an
other-focused evoked more helping of the victims involved.
Our manipulation of self- and other-focus shows some resemblance to the
distinction between independent versus interdependent self-construals (Singelis,
1994). However, it is important to distinguish between the construal of the situation
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(self-focused vs. other-focused) and self-construal (independent vs. interdependent).
Self-construal refers to whether people describe themselves in terms of group
membership or in terms of individual qualities. A self-focused versus and other-
focused construal of the situation refers to whether people construe a certain
situation by focusing on personal consequences (i.e., a self-focus) or by taking into
account other people’s feelings, consequences and outcomes (i.e., an other-focus).
Earlier studies, focusing on self-construal and empathic and derogatory reactions,
have shown mixed results. On the one hand, studies have shown that interdepen-
dence is associated with greater empathy, perspective taking and recognition of
others’ emotions (e.g., Cohen, Hoshino-Browne & Leung, 2007). This could
indicate that an interdependent self-construal is comparable to an other-focus. On
the other hand, research that focused specifically on reactions following BJW threats
(Van Prooijen & Van den Bos, 2009) showed that people with an interdependent
self-construal tend to blame innocent victims more than people with an independent
self-construal. This indicates that an interdependent self-construal is more
comparable to a self-focus instead.
In line with the explanation of Van Prooijen and Van den Bos (2009), we propose
that these different findings may be explained by the fact that an interdependent
self-construal leads to an assimilation with others. In general this may lead to
greater empathy, but when people assimilate with a victim specifically, this may
heighten the fear of a similar ill fate bestowing on them. Our findings fit with this
idea, as a self-focus also led to more victim blaming and less helping than an other-
focus. Hence, an assimilation with a victim may be caused by a focus on the self.
Thus, while similar in some regards, independent and interdependent self-construals
and self-focused and other-focused construals of the situation, respectively, can lead
to very different reactions toward innocent victims who pose a BJW threat.
More broadly, our findings add to the seminal theories that make a distinction
between people as rational economic decision makers and social-oriented individ-
uals (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske et al., 2007; Van
Lange et al., 1997). In the current research, we show differentiated reactions toward
victim of injustice following a self-focus versus an other-focus. Whereas the homo
economicus more likely resolves unjust situations by blaming or derogating the
victim, the homo socialis more likely tries to alleviate the victims’ suffering by
helping or supporting them.
Coda
Benevolent reactions following a confrontation with injustice are often visible in the
real world. People can go to great lengths to help innocent victims of natural
disasters, charity raisers can be a great success and people take to the streets to
protest against grave injustices all over the world. We would like to suggest that it
now is the time to also move research on social justice and the reactions people have
toward innocent victims of injustice beyond the derogatory reactions and integrate
help and support in the scope of reactions that can occur after a confrontation with
injustice. In our research, we hope to have taken a step in this direction by showing
that a self-focus makes victim blaming a viable way of dealing with injustice, while
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an other-focus increases the likelihood that people will help the victims involved.
As such, we have tried to put both the ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘us’’ in ‘‘justice.’’
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